The Quest for Happiness Is a Universal Fact. It is a scientific fact, which means we can measure happiness, we can assess it, and we can devise strategies to make ourselves happy and fulfilled human beings. So says Professor Gad Saad, the author of the sensational bestseller The Parasitic Mind and the irrepressible host of The Saad Truth podcast. In this provocative, entertaining, and life-changing new book, he roams through the scientific studies, culls the wisdom of ancient philosophy (...) and religion, and draws on his extraordinary personal experience as a refugee from war-torn Lebanon turned academic celebrity. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the educational use of the Internet and of digital technologies that is neither pessimistic nor optimistic, that is neither critical nor post-critical. Turning to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s comments on studying and its relationship to the technology of the blank writing tablet, the authors argue that digital devises are a radical transformation in our relationship to the technologies of reading and writing. Traditionally, the scholar was able to experience his or her potentiality to communicate (...) through writing via the blankness of the writing tablet. Yet, according to Agamben, such blankness has become inaccessible in the digital age, where the screen is always full of content. Here the authors argue that Agamben is correct in his diagnosis, yet his own theory of communicability offers up a way to redeem the educational use of digital devices. It is precisely the overflowing saturation of communications on the Internet which produces a new kind of blankness. It is this blankness which should thus become the focus of a studious form of media literacy—one that is not critical or post-critical so much as pre-critical. (shrink)

The proliferation of digital devices in educational settings has contributed to the decentralization of knowledge from teachers and established textbooks to fluid online personalized resources, and...

Knowledge of our own memory processes, whether driven by prior experiences or beliefs, is crucial in perceiving and interacting with our environment. This knowledge and awareness is metamemory, whi...

Calvino’s reflection on _quickness_ brings the reader through a zig-zag journey without a predefined destination, crossing the history of literature in order to think about writing and the relationship between physical speed and speed of mind. To discuss _quickness_ as a virtue, Calvino refers to the potentiality of human reasoning and typifies different styles of thought. Elaborating on _quickness_ as a quality and a virtue in the contemporary societal and more particularly educational context which is conceptualized as “accelerated time” (Rosa (...) _Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity_, 2013) and “network time” (Hassan _Time & Society_ 12:226–241, 2003) might at first glance seem somewhat irrelevant. However, the pressing relevance of this virtue lies precisely in the digitized direction which school education is faced with. The shift towards digital school education bears the implication of decoupling the space and time of education from the here and now of the classroom. This, on the flip side means allowing global events as well as personal happenings of the teacher and students to enter the classroom, leading the lesson time to become a poly-synchronous time. That is against this contemporary background of digital education that this article attempts to relate to Calvino’s understanding of quickness. The article embarks on characterizing four aspects of Calvino’s reading of quickness and problematizes their manifestation in the current digital school education climate and finally, it seeks to open some concrete horizons for re-introducing quickness as a virtue for education in the digital age. (shrink)

While compulsory licensing is described in the TRIPS agreement as flexibility to protect public health by improving access to medicines in developing countries, a recent literature contends adversely that CL may harm public health. Therefore, this article intends to evaluate the usefulness of CL in the South through the prism of obligations and goals entrusted to patent holders and in light of experiences in Thailand and Brazil regarding access to antiretroviral drugs. In this way, it shows that the obligations assigned (...) to patent holders were better served by the recipients of CL and brought significant health and industrial benefits in the two high middle-income countries. In particular, CL allowed the scaling-up of free and universal access to antiretroviral drugs by assuring the financial sustainability of these public health programs endangered by monopolistic practices from patent holders. (shrink)

Ontologies are the prime way of organizing data in the Semantic Web. Often, it is necessary to combine several, independently developed ontologies to obtain a complete representation of a domain of interest. The complementarity of existing ontologies can be leveraged by merging them. Existing approaches for ontology merging mostly implement a binary merge. However, with the growing number and size of relevant ontologies across domains, scalability becomes a central challenge. A multi-ontology merging technique offers a potential solution to this problem. (...) We present Co Merger, a scalable multiple ontologies merging method. It takes as input a set of source ontologies and existing mappings across them and generates a merged ontology. For efficient processing, rather than successively merging complete ontologies pairwise, we group related concepts across ontologies into partitions and merge first within and then across those partitions. In both steps, user-specified subsets of generic merge requirements (GMRs) are taken into account and used to optimize outputs. The experimental results on well-known datasets confirm the feasibility of our approach and demonstrate its superiority over binary strategies. A prototypical implementation is freely accessible through a live web portal. (shrink)

Love’s Subtle Magic: An Indian Islamic Literary Tradition, 1379–1545. By Aditya Behl, edited by Wendy Doniger. New York: Oxford Universoty Press, 2012. Pp. xii + 403. $74.

IntroductionMaking appropriate plans for the provision of hospice care is considered a perceived need in the Iranian health system. The current study aimed to develop a model for establishing hospice care delivery system for the adult patients with cancer.Materials and MethodsThis study is part of a larger study that has been done in four phases. This Health System Policy Research utilized a mixed qualitative-quantitative approach. At the first phase, a qualitative study was conducted which explained the care needs and the (...) requirements for establishing this system from the stakeholders’ perspective. The second phase aimed to examine the current situation of hospice care delivery in Iran and identify and determine the similarities and differences among them in the selected countries. At the third phase, the main areas of the model and the related indicators were extracted and prioritized by consulting with experts. Then the model was formulated. At the fourth phase, the proposed model was validated and finalized in terms of importance, scientific acceptability, and feasibility.ResultsBased on the developed model the first and the most important step in establishing the hospice care delivery system is laying the groundwork in the health system which requires focusing on policymaking. It is necessary to establish hospice centers and implement public awareness raising programs, train, and supply expert manpower, strengthen family physician and referral process, formulate clinical guidelines, encourage the private sector and NGOs.) to invest, develop end-of-life and hospice care service packages, and create quality care indicators. The proposed model had moderate feasibility.ConclusionThis model was developed based on the current Iranian healthcare structure and the needs of terminally ill cancer patients. It can be used as a model tailored to the current state of the health system and community in Iran. It is suggested to use this model as a pilot at the regional level. (shrink)

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O presente trabalho se propõe a refletir acerca do sofrimento emergido em meio à grave crise sanitária instalada pela pandemia do novo coronavírus (SARS-COV-2), considerando as mudanças nas dinâmicas de vida da população como a adoção de medidas de distanciamento social, quarentena, uso de máscaras, dentre outras contingências que transformaram o cotidiano e o ritmo das existências contemporâneas. O crescente número de casos e mortes, as modificações nas rotinas de casa, trabalho e relações sociais vêm repercutindo na saúde mental das (...) pessoas e desencadeando vários sofrimentos, expressos nas queixas que chegam diariamente aos serviços de acolhimento psicológico.Considerando, assim, a experiência de escuta clínica das pessoas em sofrimento neste período, com o objetivo de refletir sobre os modos de vida e sofrimento que se desvelam em meio ao contexto pandêmico, recorremos ao pensamento do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger para pensar o tédio e a técnica moderna como os sentidos e afetos que caracterizam e afinam as existências contemporâneas; bem como as suas repercussões nas experiências de sofrimento que se revelam em meio aos novos modos de existência assumidos durante a pandemia de covid-19. (shrink)

The demonstration that dendritic cell (DC)‐derived exosomes can be exploited for targeted RNAi delivery to the brain after systemic injection provides the first proof‐of‐concept for the potential of these naturally occurring vesicles as vehicles of drug delivery. As well as being amenable to existing in vivo targeting strategies already in use for viruses and liposomes, this novel approach offers the added advantages of in vivo safety and low immunogenicity. Fulfilment of the potential of exosome delivery methods warrants a better understanding (...) of their biology, as well as the development of novel production, characterisation, targeting and cargo‐loading nanotechnologies. Ultimately, exosome‐mediated drug delivery promises to overcome important challenges in the field of therapeutics, such as delivery of drugs across otherwise impermeable biological barriers, such as the blood brain barrier, and using patient‐derived tissue as a source of individualised and biocompatible therapeutic drug delivery vehicles. (shrink)

The works of Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921, 1936) seek to clarify confusion about uncertainty. According to these authors, a precise analysis of uncertainty is required, in order to obtain a clear significance of the concept and understand the consequences for the decision process. Consequently, Knight and Keynes study the content of the decision process in uncertainty and converge towards similar views on the mobilization of confidence. Their works thus go beyond a simple examination of uncertainty, by also throwing light (...) on the role and function of confidence in economic analysis. These works demonstrate that confidence is the prerequisite for individual action under uncertainty. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that discovering that our universe is fine-tuned should make us more confident that other universes exist. My defense exploits a distinction between ideal and non-ideal evidential support. I use that distinction in concert with a simple model to disarm the most influential objection—the this-universe objection—to the view that fine-tuning supports the existence of other universes. However, the simple model fails to capture some important features of our epistemic situation with respect to fine-tuning. To capture these (...) features, I introduce a more sophisticated model. I then use the more sophisticated model to show that, even once those complicating factors are taken into account, fine-tuning should boost our confidence in the existence of other universes. (shrink)

As ever more advanced digital systems are created, it becomes increasingly likely that some of these systems will be digital minds, i.e. digital subjects of experience. With digital minds comes the risk of digital suffering. The problem of digital suffering is that of mitigating this risk. We argue that the problem of digital suffering is a high stakes moral problem and that formidable epistemic obstacles stand in the way of solving it. We then propose a strategy for solving it: Access (...) Monitor Prevent (AMP). AMP uses a ‘dancing qualia’ argument to link the functional states of certain digital systems to their experiences—this yields epistemic access to digital minds. With that access, we can prevent digital suffering by only creating advanced digital systems that we have such access to, monitoring their functional profiles, and preventing them from entering states with functional markers of suffering. After introducing and motivating AMP, we confront limitations it faces and identify some options for overcoming them. We argue that AMP fits especially well with—and so provides a moral reason to prioritize—one approach to creating such systems: whole brain emulation. We also contend that taking other paths to digital minds would be morally risky. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences are non-physical states that exist alongside physical states. Dualism leads to the postulation of psychophysical laws that generate experiences by operating on certain sorts of physical states. What sorts of physical states? To the limited extent that dualists have addressed this question, they have tended to favor a brain-based approach that locates the physical basis of experience in the head. In contrast, this paper develops an argument for a form of dualism on which experience has a (...) physical basis that reaches out into the world. Specifically, the argument uses a puzzle about spatial experience to support a theory I call _tracking dualism_. On tracking dualism, a psychophysical law generates experiences by operating on complex physical states that involve both brain states and tracking relations that they bear to features of the environment. To develop the argument, I discuss tracking dualism alongside its more familiar physicalist counterpart, the tracking intentionalist theory associated with Dretske, Lycan, and Tye. I conclude by outlining a tracking dualist research agenda. (shrink)

Dualism holds that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing (...) out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy. (shrink)

Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. I favour an interactionist dualist version of realizationism on which experiences are non-physical states that non-redundantly cause problem judgments. This view is subject to the challenges of specifying laws that would enable experiences to cause problem judgments and of explaining why (...) it's not a lucky coincidence that experiences' causal and rational powers converge on problem judgments. I propose a strategy for solving the meta-problem and meeting these challenges. According to it, a fundamental teleological law operates on normative features of experiences in ways that bias experiences towards causing effects that they rationalize, including problem judgments. I conclude by applying the strategy to other luck-avoidance challenges. (shrink)

Respect for Autonomy has been a mainstay of medical ethics since its enshrinement as one of the four principles of biomedical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress’ in the late 1970s. This paper traces the development of this modern concept from Antiquity to the present day, paying attention to its Enlightenment origins in Kant and Rousseau. The rapid C20th developments of bioethics and RFA are then considered in the context of the post-war period and American socio-political thought. The validity and utility (...) of the RFA are discussed in light of this philosophical-historical account. It is concluded that it is not necessary to embrace an ethic of autonomy in order to guard patients from coercion or paternalism, and that, on the contrary, the dominance of autonomy threatens to undermine those very things which have helped doctors come to view and respect their patients as persons. (shrink)

Some physical theories predict that almost all brains in the universe are Boltzmann brains, i.e. short-lived disembodied brains that are accidentally assembled as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. Physicists and philosophers of physics widely regard this proliferation as unacceptable, and so take its prediction as a basis for rejecting these theories. But the putatively unacceptable consequences of this prediction follow only given certain philosophical assumptions. This paper develops a strategy for shielding physical theorizing from the threat of Boltzmann (...) brains. The strategy appeals to a form of phenomenal externalism about the physical basis of consciousness. Given that form of phenomenal externalism, the proliferation of Boltzmann brains turns out to be benign. While the strategy faces a psychophysical fine-tuning problem, it both alleviates cosmological fine-tuning concerns that attend physics-based solutions to Boltzmann brain problems and pays explanatory dividends in connection with time’s arrow. (shrink)

Though not myself a physicalist, I develop a new argument against antiphysicalist positions that are motivated by zombie arguments. I first identify four general features of phenomenal states that are candidates for non-physical types; these are used to generate different types of zombie. I distinguish two antiphysicalist positions: strict dualism, which posits exactly one general non-physical type, and pluralism, which posits more than one such type. It turns out that zombie arguments threaten strict dualism and some pluralist positions as much (...) as they threaten physicalism—indeed, more so, since such positions need zombies to motivate them as alternatives to physicalism—and that the only pluralist position that escapes zombie arguments has a radically inflated ontology. (shrink)

Interactionists hold that minds are non-physical objects that interact with brains. The neural discernment problem for interactionism is that of explaining how non-physical minds produce behavior and cognition by exercising different causal powers over physiologically similar neurons. This paper sharpens the neural discernment problem and proposes two interactionist models of mind-brain interaction that solve it. One model avoids overdetermination while the other respects the causal closure of the physical domain.

Experiences tend to be followed by states for which they provide normative reasons. Such harmonious correlations cry out for explanation. Theories that answer or diminish these cries thereby achieve an advantage over theories that do neither. I argue that the main lines of response to these cries that are available to biological theorists—theorists who hold (roughly) that conscious subjects are generally biological entities—are problematic. And I argue that panpsychism—which holds (roughly) that conscious subjects are ubiquitous in nature—provides an attractive response (...) to these explanatory cries. Taken together, these considerations underwrite a kind of ‘psychophysical fine-tuning’ argument in support of panpsychism, one that is reminiscent of cosmological fine-tuning arguments in favor of multiverse hypotheses. (shrink)

This paper argues that healthcare aims at the good of health, that this pursuit of the good necessitates conscience, and that conscience is required in every practical judgement, including clinical...

I explore two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality: spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. Roughly, spatial functionalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties are those playing a certain causal role in producing spatial experience while spatial presentationalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties include those presented in spatial experience. I argue that each view, in its own way, leads to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism: whereas spatial functionalism leads to primitivism about phenomenal representation, spatial presentationalism (...) leads to primitivism about spatial properties. I conclude by discussing how to adjudicate between spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. (shrink)

Florence Ashley has argued that requiring patients with gender dysphoria to undergo an assessment and referral from a mental health professional before undergoing hormone replacement therapy (HRT) is unethical and may represent an unconscious hostility towards transgender people. We respond, first, by showing that Ashley has conflated the self-reporting of symptoms with self-diagnosis, and that this is not consistent with the standard model of informed consent to medical treatment. Second, we note that the model of informed consent involved in cosmetic (...) surgery resembles the model Ashley defends, and that psychological assessment and referral is recognised as an important aspect of such a model. Third, we suggest that the increased prevalence of psychiatric morbidity in the transgender population arguably supports the requirement of assessment and referral from a mental health professional prior to undergoing HRT. (shrink)

In her paper ‘Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection’, Minerva rightly identifies cosmetic surgery as an interesting test case for the question of conscientious objection in medicine. Her treatment of this important subject, however, seems problematic. It is argued that Minerva's suggestion that a doctor has a prima facie duty to satisfy patient preferences even against his better clinical judgment, which we call Patient Preference Absolutism, must be regarded with scepticism. This is because it overlooks an important distinction regarding autonomy's meaning (...) and place in clinical practice, and it makes obsolete the important concepts of expert clinical judgment and beneficence. Finally, we discuss two ideas which emerge from consideration of cosmetic surgery in relation to conscientious objection. These are the possible analogy between clinical judgment and conscientious objection, and the possible role the goals of medicine can play in defining the scope of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Gauge invariance of a manifestly covariant relativistic quantum theory with evolution according to an invariant time τ implies the existence of five gauge compensation fields, which we shall call pre-Maxwell fields. A Lagrangian which generates the equations of motion for the matter field (coinciding with the Schrödinger type quantum evolution equation) as well as equations, on a five-dimensional manifold, for the gauge fields, is written. It is shown that τ integration of the equations for the pre-Maxwell fields results in the (...) usual Maxwell equations with conserved current source. The analog of the O (3, 1) symmetry of the usual Maxwell theory is found to be O (3, 2) or O (4, 1), depending on the space-time Fourier spectrum of the field. We argue that the structure that is relevant to the description of radiation in interaction with matter evolving in a timelike sense is that of O (3, 2). The noncovariant form of the field equations is given; there are two fields of electric type and one (divergenceless) magnetic type field. The Noether currents are studied, and some remarks are made on second quantization. (shrink)

The chief motivation for epiphenomenalist dualism is its promise to solve dualism’s causal exclusion problem without inducing causal overdetermination or violations of the causal closure of the physical. This paper argues that epiphenomenalist dualism is itself susceptible to an exclusion problem. The problem exploits symmetries of determination and influence generated by a wide class of physical theories. Further, I argue that there is an interference effect between solving epiphenomenalist dualism's exclusion problem and using epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the (...) causal exclusion problem. What emerges is an overlooked, empirically-motivated challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism. (shrink)

Debate persists over the place of conscience in medicine. Some argue for the complete exclusion of conscientious objection, while others claim an absolute right of refusal. This paper proposes that claims of conscientious objection can and should be permitted if they concern kinds of actions which fall outside of the normative standard of medicine, which is the pursuit of health. Medical practice which meets this criterion we call medicine qua medicine. If conscientious refusal concerns something consonant with the health-restoring aims (...) of medicine, it entails a desertion of professional duty. If, however, it relates to something other than medicine qua medicine, it can rightly be refused. It thus becomes possible to test instances of conscientious objection to determine their validity, and thereby conserve both the principle of conscientious objection and define its scope. This test of conscience prevents arbitrary discrimination, and preserves doctors’ agency. It is a theoretical razor rooted in the pra... (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show how the functionalist standards assumed in the AI debate are, in fact, the assumptions of a capitalist, ableist society writ large. The already established argument against the proposed humanity of AI systems implies a wider critique of the entire ideology of functionalism under which the notion of intelligent machines has taken root.

Hoping to bring some objectivity to the debate, Ben-Moshe has argued that conscientious objection in medicine should be accommodated based on its concordance with the ‘impartial spectator’, a metaphor for conscience drawn from the writings of Adam Smith. This response finds fault with this account on two fronts: first, that its claim to objectivity is unsubstantiated; second, that it implicitly relies on moral absolutes, despite claiming that conscience is a social construct, thereby calling its coherence and claims into question. Briefly, (...) a traditional account of conscience is then described, before ending with a related thesis for future discussion. (shrink)

In this article I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward earlier events: other things equal, we should prefer for good events to occur earlier and disprefer for bad events to occur earlier. The argument contends that we should accord at least some credence—if only a small one—to a theoretical package featuring the growing block theory of time and that this package generates a presumptive bias toward earlier events. Rival theoretical packages are considered. Under reasonable allocations of (...) credence to them, the presumptive bias escapes defeat. The argument has several corollaries: other things equal, we should be biased toward the past over the future, the further past over the nearer past, and the nearer future over the further future. (shrink)

A causal argument for physicalism is widely held to pose a problem for dualism. This view has an unobvious presupposition, namely that the causal closure of the physical has a special sort of ground. The requisite sort of ground must distinguish the causal argument for physicalism from many defective causal arguments. On behalf of physicalists, I develop an account of the ground for the causal closure of the physical, thereby putting the causal argument for physicalism back in the business of (...) causally problematizing dualism. One consequence of my account is that physicalists can pose a causal problem for dualism using a much weaker closure premise than is generally assumed. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as (...) a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call delegatory dualism—experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states. (shrink)

This brief and remarkably inexpensive book by the distinguished Professor Maehle of Durham University is composed of five detailed studies of aspects of nineteenth and twentieth century British med...

Räsänen has attempted to make a moral case for permitting some people to change their legal age: if someone considers that their chronological age does not correspond to their emotional age or biological age, and they face age-based discrimination as a result, they may change the legal record of their age. This response considers some of the problems with Räsänen’s paper, including its reliance on equivocation. It concludes that what is billed as a moral argument turns out to be a (...) conflicted case for deception which relies on a nihilistic outlook on reality. (shrink)

The pairing argument aims to demonstrate the impossibility of non-spatial objects (including minds) standing in causal relations. Its chief premises are (roughly) that causation requires pairing relations between causes and effects and that pairing relations require spatial relations. Critics have argued that the first claim suffers from counterexamples involving indeterministic causation. After briefly rehearsing the pairing argument and the objection from indeterministic causation, I offer two ways of revising the pairing argument to meet the objection from indeterministic causation.

Interactionists hold that non-spatial objects causally interact with physical objects. Interactionists have traditionally grappled with the puzzle of how such interaction is possible. More recently, Jaegwon Kim has presented interactionists with a more daunting threat: the pairing argument, which purports to refute interactionism by showing that non-spatial objects cannot stand in causal relations. After reviewing that argument, I develop a challenge to it on behalf of the interactionist. The challenge poses a dilemma: roughly, either haecceities exist or they do not. (...) I argue that the pairing argument fails in either case. While the challenge does not explain exactly how the pairing argument goes wrong, it shows that the argument fails. The challenge also explains the difficulty in pinpointing the pairing argument’s failure: exactly how the pairing argument fails depends on difficult issues concerning the nature of objects. (shrink)

Heidegger develops his reading of a-lētheia as privative un-concealment (Unverborgenheit) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive difficulties (...) in Parmenides through his interpretation of alētheia and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing logos. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment. (shrink)

Reductive physicalists typically accept the causal argument for their view. On this score, Tiehen parts ways with his fellow reductive physicalists. Heretically, he argues that reductive physicalists should reject the causal argument. After presenting Tiehen's challenge, I defend the orthodoxy. Although not myself a reductive physicalist, I show how reductive physicalists can resist this challenge to the causal argument. I conclude with a positive suggestion about how reductive physicalists should use the causal argument.

The conventional historical account of the concept of brain death credits developments and discoveries of the twentieth century with its inception, emphasizing the role of technological developments and professional conferences, notably the 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death. This essay argues that the French physician Eugène Bouchut anticipated the concept of brain death as early as 1846. Correspondence with Bouchut’s understanding of brain death and one important contemporary concept of brain (...) death is established then contrasted with current trends of defining death as the death of the brain. The philosophical factors that influenced Bouchut and the later developments of concepts of brain death are considered, with special reference to mechanistic philosophy and vitalism. (shrink)

In _The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind_, Julian Jaynes presents a philosophy of mind with radical implications for contemporary discussions about artificial intelligence (AI). The ability of AI to replicate the cognitive functions of human consciousness has led to widespread speculation that AI is itself conscious (or will eventually become so). Against this functionalist theory of mind, Jaynes argues that consciousness only arises through the mythopoetic inspiration of metaphorical language. Consciousness develops and enacts new forms (...) of self-understanding, continually evolving new "metaphors of mind," metaphors which must now account for the emergence of AI. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences and physical states are distinct in that neither sort of state is identical with or grounded in the other. Cognitive phenomenal realism holds that cognitive experiences are irreducible to sensory experiences. While dualism and cognitive phenomenal realism are logically orthogonal and usually discussed separately, I argue that dualism’s plausibility is sensitive to whether cognitive phenomenal realism is true. In particular, I argue that if cognitive phenomenal realism is true, then it bolsters the case for dualism via (...) a cognitive knowledge argument that has several advantages over the standard sensory knowledge argument. (shrink)